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Abstract:
Purpose: The purpose of  this paper is to build new contracts theories of  SaaS service supply
chain. Software as a Service (SaaS) has become a hot topic in this industry. Compared with
traditional manufacturing supply chain and general service supply chain, the new IT service
supply  chain which based on SaaS has characteristics  of  both service  and IT. And SaaS is
completely different from traditional software package model. Therefore the classic contracts,
which be widely used in traditional manufacturing supply chain, can’t be directly applied in SaaS
service supply chain. The necessary way of  IT services developing is to study the SaaS service
supply chain combining with characteristics of  SaaS. Therefore, It focuses on the coordination
of  SaaS service supply chain. 
Design/methodology/approach: It tries to answer the following question: how do the ISV motivate
SaaS  operators  to  improve  the  service  level  through  effective  contracts  mechanism  under
conditions of  asymmetric information.  In order to answer these questions,  this paper does
some researches including:  Under  the conditions of  information asymmetry,  supposing the
service level (is related to the degree of  effort) of  SaaS operator was private information, we
construct model of  compensation contract, i.e., to motivate SaaS operator to improve service
level through transfer payments of  compensation price. 
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Findings and originality/value: The study finds  out  that  when ISV get  to “positive  feedback”,
instead of  the traditional market equilibrium,  compensation contract  (linear) can coordinate
satisfactorily the SaaS service supply chain. In  the point of  “positive feedback”, the marginal
revenue equals the marginal cost, but it is not the equilibrium of  ISV’profit-maximization.
Research limitations/implications: There  are  some limitations  in  this  research.  In  the  linear
compensation contracts, the compensation price is fixed value. If  in the contract, we can create
a change value which is related to the sales volume of  service, the coordination efficiency of
compensation  will  be  increased.  And  in  the  future,  the  nonlinear  compensation  contracts
should be researched. 
Practical implications: In the practical implication, it will promote the development of  study and
practice of  SaaS and IT service industry. And it is beneficial to ISV, platform operators and
customers. 
Originality/value: From the theoretical perspective, this paper put forward some new contracts
and motivating mechanism for effective coordination of  SaaS service supply  chain and the
conclusion will enrich content of  service supply chain theory system. In theory, it has more
significance for further researching on SaaS and service supply chain. 
Keywords: SaaS (Software as a Service), service supply chain, compensation contracts, coordination, the
cervice level, positive feedback
1. Introduction
The service level is the key of service supply chain coordinating. The SaaS service supply chain
is no exception. It is a new arena which has attracted the attention of academic circles. Some
scholars have done few researches about SaaS and SaaS supply chain, such as coordination
strategies of  SaaS supply chain (Demirkan,  Cheng & Bandyopadhyay,  2010), contracts for
software or services (Dey,  Fan & Zhang, 2009; Roels, Karmarkar & Carr, 2010), competition
between Shrink-Wrap software and  SaaS(Fan,  Kumar  & Whinston,  2009)  and other  topics
related to SaaS (Susarla, Barua & Whinston, 2010). However, there are still a large research
space,  especially  in  the  coordination  contracts  of  SaaS  service  supply  chain  (Yan,  Guo  &
Schatzberg, 2012).
In  traditional  manufacturing  supply  chain,  the  upstream  manufacturers  are  unable  to
accurately  obtain  sales  information  from the  downstream retailers  because  of  information
asymmetry (Zhang, Liu, Wu & Jiao, 2010). Therefore they motivate retailers to increase the
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number of orders by repurchasing surplus products (Cachon & Lariviere, 2001; Van Donselaar,
Gaur, Van Woensel, Broekmeulen & Fransoo, 2010). But for perishable goods, as we know, the
buyback quantities the less the better either to manufacturers or distributors. Tsay (2001)
reports  that  retailers  often  use  “price  compensation”  to  reduce  the  buyback  quantities  in
industries.  The service ability  can not be stored,  which leads to  the limitation  of buyback
contracts application, but “price compensation” has a good applicability for the coordination of
the service ability. There are few literatures (Shao & Ji, 2008; Yan, 2010; Arie & Grieco, 2012)
have applied Compensation contracts in the service plan of supply chain. In the Compensation
contracts, one party motivates the other to increase sales or improve investment of service by
a certain amount of price compensation in a supply chain.
In SaaS service supply chain, online service delivery is the main value-added chain (Concha,
Espadas, Romero & Molina, 2010; Katzmarzik, 2011). Because software service can’t be stored
or exchanged (Mathew & Nair, 2010), buyback contract will not work. The software service has
the common features which are different  between general  service  and products  (Mietzner,
Leymann & Unger, 2011), and “price compensation” can also be applied. ISVs can motive SaaS
operators  to  improve  the  service  level,  to  expand  market  sales  and  increase  customer
satisfaction through a certain amount of “price compensation”.
In reality, lots of SaaS operators often need to increase input on network security operation in
order to guarantee the quality of service and avoid the risk loss caused by service quality
problems, such as service disruption. In addition, they also need ISVs to ensure the quality
and quantity of service to meet online customer demands. Owing to that when singing the
contract,  SaaS  operators  request  for  submission  of  security  fees  from  ISVs,  such  as
Salesforce.com, or risk margin system of Alisoft. 
Salesforce.com has a detailed  ISVs  Partner  Program. In  this  program, Salesforce.com has
developed  a  detailed  ISV  service  security  fee  system.  Although  Salesforce.com  does  not
charge ISVs for  technical  service fee, ISVs which join the partner program need to pay a
certain amount of security costs, or they can’t use online service platform AppExchange and
other services of Salesforce.com.
The Alisoft’s risk margin is no less than 5000 RMB in technical service charging standards,
which is used for compensation funds to guarantee the service level. ISVs should pay a certain
amount  of  money  according  to  the  consumer  security  service  details,  which  provides
consumers with the security service after they order ISVs’ products releasing on the Alisoft
platform. Risk margin should be deposited and frozen in ISVs’ Alipay account. After ISVs sign
the  Alisoft  platform  cooperation  agreement,  Alisoft  can  instruct  Alipay  to  freeze  the
corresponding amount payment of the Alipay account as risk margin. Alipay has a right to
notify ISVs to adjust the amount of margin by written notice (including but not limited to
email, fax) according to ISVs’ business change and the actual compensation. If ISVs fail to
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complement the risk margin of their Alipay account after receiving the notice for ten days,
Alisoft has the right to immediately suspend or terminate the cooperation agreements. And
ISVs needn’t pay for technical service fee to Alisoft (www. Alisoft.com) besides the 5000 RMB
risk margin. Thus, the risk of SaaS operators has got certain guarantee when they face with
large  events  such  as  service  interrupt,  and  risk  margin  ensures  consumers  can  get
compensation in time.
Therefore,  this  paper  will  build  a  Compensation  contract  mechanism based  on  the  above
analysis and realistic  foundation.  We will  set  service security  fee as a contract  parameter,
compensating price as a decision variable of ISVs and service level as a decision variable of
SaaS operators.
2. The Problem Description and Basic Model
we consider a two-stage supply chain which is composed of an ISV (Independent Software
Vendors)and a SaaS operator. 
Only a single kind of service and a single sales cycle be considered, and it is supposed that in a
single sales cycle, q is the capability of service providing of SaaS operators. That’s to say, the
effective demand will be bigger than zero and less than q. 
• p: The rent of unit service, 
• πi: Revenue function of ISV, 
• πs: Revenue function of SaaS platform operator, 
• Cs: Fixed costs of platform operator in a single sales cycle, 
• Cos: Variable costs of platform operator(measure by time, the variable costs of monthly
service), 
• Ci: Fixed costs of ISV in a single sales cycle, 
• Coi: Variable costs of ISV for unit service (measure by month), Cos + Coi < p; 
The demand of market for online software service is a random variable D (p), which is related
to the price. Its distribution function is F(x,p) (x>0), density function is f(x,p). And 
∂ f (x , p)
∂ p
exist and is not equal to zero. 
It is supposed that the service level is a continuous variable (μ) which is related to the degree
of effort. The SaaS operator has to pay a certain costs in order to improve the service level
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and service level is higher, the higher the cost. The cost function of the SaaS operator under
the appropriate service can be written as (Zhang, 1996; Laffont & Martimort, 2002): 
C (u) = 1
2
aμ 2 , constant a > 0.
The sales volume of Service is  Q =  εμ  +  θ,  ε is output coefficient (ε > 0), and  θ is market
random factors.
We build a basic model of Compensation contract based on unlimited service capability (q→∞).
First, the ISV pays a certain amount of service security fees to the SaaS operator, such as
Salesforce.com. And then It pay a certain amount of compensation prices to incentive SaaS
operator to choose the service level good for the ISV (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. The Basic Model of Compensation Contract
We suppose the service security fee is f0, the unit compensation price is f1, and 0 < f0 < p.
In a centralized supply chain two parties have a unified decision-making process, but in a
decentralized supply chain the ISV and the SaaS operator make the decision respectively, and
the sequence of decision is as follows: 
• Both parties determine contract parameter (f0 ), which is service security fee,
• The ISV determines the best compensation price (f1) based on f0,
• The SaaS operator observes the ISV’s decision of f1, then makes the decision on service
level (μ) to maximize its own interest considering contract parameter (f0).
Service capability is unlimited (q→∞),therefore in the basic model the cost of service-delaying
does not exist.
In centralized supply chain, the target function maximizing the joint profits of supply chain can
be expressed as:
max
μ
π ( p , u)= pQ(μ)−CT−(C0i+C 0s)· Q(μ)−
1
2
a μ2 , here CT = C i+C s
∂π
∂μ = ( p−C 0i+C0s) ·ε−a μ    
∂2π
∂π 2
< 0 ,
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Therefore a maximum value exists.
Let ∂π∂μ = 0 , the optimal service level is given by μ
* =
ε · ( p−C0i−C0s)
a
The  service  level  is  the  reaction  function  of  market  service  rent  (p).  It  is  a  parameter
determined by the market in Compensation contract, rather than a decision variable.
In decentralized supply chain, the target function of ISV can be written as:
max
f 1
π i( f 1 ,μ)= ( p− f 1)Q(μ)− f 0−C i−C0i ·Q (μ)
The target function of SaaS operator can be written as:
max
μ
π s( f 1 ,μ) = f 1 · Q(μ)+ f 0−C s−C 0s · Q (μ)−
1
2
a μ 2
It is supposed that the service level of the operator is not stable, when the operator’s service
level can meet the market demands, then the ISV pays the compensation price. If the service
demands can not be fulfilled, for example service delaying, the ISV will not pay it.
3. The Coordination under Linear Compensation Contract
When the demand is less than the maximum market capacity which SaaS operator supplies q
(Service capacity), the market demand will always be met. Which means that when the service
capacity is unlimited, namely, Q<q, we established the linear Compensation contract ,setting
the Compensation price as the independent decision variable. If  SaaS operator can supply
services to meet all the market demands, then the ISV will give the SaaS operator a fixed
Compensation price per  unit  f1.  However  if  the SaaS operators  can’t  provide the required
service level,  then they will  not  get the compensation. That is,  when the market demand
exceeds the maximum market capacity,  the supply chain may incur the service outage or
service  delay,  ISV will  not  pay the SaaS operator  the Compensation price.  Therefore,  the
Compensation contract model is established basing on the hypothesis of the service capacity
unlimited. There is the basic model, as shown in Figure 1.
3.1. Independent decision of SaaS operator and ISV in decentralized supply chain
Based on basic model, The objective function of SaaS operator is that：
max
μ
π s( f 1 ,μ) = f 1·Q(μ)+ f 0−C s−C0s ·Q (μ)−
1
2
α μ2
(1)
∂π s
∂μ = ε ( f 1−C0s)−α μ
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Solving the first-order condition for the optimal service level by maximizing the profit function,
we obtain the following service level:
μ s1
* = εα ( f 1
*−C0s) (2)
The service level  is  the reaction function of compensation price,  
∂μ *( f 1)
∂ f 1
= εα > 0, so the
service level set by the SaaS operator is increasing in the compensation price given by ISV.
From the decision-making order and the expression of the optimal service level, we can find
that the optimal decision of SaaS operator depends on the compensation price decision of ISV.
After substituting the optimal  service level (see it  formula 2) into the ISV’s profit  function
max
f 1
π i( f 1 ,μ s1
* ) , the first-order condition for ISV’s maximization problem gives the following
compensation price for ISV:
f 1
* =
p+C 0s−C0i
2
(3)
Theorem 1: In the case of service capacity unlimited (Q<q), by using the linear compensation
contract,  we  get  the  optimal  service  level  of  centralization  decision-making  as:
ε · ( p−C0i−C0s)
a
;  the  optimal  service  level  of  decentralization  decision-making  as:
ε
a
( f 1−C0s) .
3.2. The comparison of service level between the decentralization decision-making
and centralization decision-making
In the case of service capacity unlimited, the service level of the centralization decision-making is
shown in Theorem 1. Obviously, when 0 < f1 < p – C0i, there exists µsl*<µ* and if p > f1 > p – C0i
there exists µsl*>µ* if f1 = p – C0i, then µsl*=µ*. That is, when the ISV’s marginal revenue equals
the marginal cost, it can coordinate the supply chain. When the compensation price ( f1) is
lower than the difference between the market service price (p) and the ISV’s variable costs
(C0i) the SaaS operator’s service level in decentralization decision-making is lower than the
service  level  in  centralization  decision-making.  While  when  the  compensation  price  (f1)  is
higher than the difference between the market service price (p) and the ISV’s variable cost
(C0i),  there  are higher  decision  efficiency  in  the decentralization  supply  chain  than in  the
centralization  supply  chain.  However,  in  fact,  this  perfect  result  is  absolutely  impossible,
because when the marginal revenue of ISV is less than the marginal cost, it is diseconomies of
scale for ISV. No change in the market price, ISV will reduce the compensation price to ensure
self-interest maximization.
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Theorem 2: In the case of service capacity unlimited (Q < q), ISV pays a fixed compensation
price per unit to the SaaS operator, which form a linear compensation contract. When the
marginal revenue of ISV equals the marginal cost, namely, p = f1 + C0i, the contract can make
the supply chain effective coordination.
From the above theorem, we can see that in the linear compensation contract, the effective
coordination of SaaS service supply chain depends on whether the compensation price can
meet the restraint that the marginal revenue equals the marginal cost, that is p = f1 + C0i.
When the compensation price meet the optimal coordination conditions p = f1 + C0i, the optimal
service level of SaaS operator equals to the optimal service level of centralization decision-
making:
μ s1
* = εα ( f 1−C0s)=
ε
α ( p−C0s−C0i )
When ISV selects the optimal compensation price, we get SaaS operator’s optimal service level
as:
μ s1
* = εα ( f 1−C 0s)=
ε
2α ( p−C0s−C0i) (4)
The  service  level  of  SaaS  operator  improves  when  the  supply  chain  achieves  effective
coordination,  which  proves  the linear  compensation  contract  is  conductive  to  improve  the
quality  of  service.  However,  when  the  supply  chain  achieves  effective  coordination,  the
decision-making to the compensation price of ISV is not their optimal decision of maximizing
self-interest. By comparing f1 =p - C0i to f1*, we find that:
( p−C0i )− f 1
* =
p−C0i−C0s
2
> 0 (5)
That means the compensation price of achieving the optimal coordination of the supply chain is
greater than ISV’s compensation price of independent decision-making. ISV needs to increase
compensation price, if he wants to inspire SaaS operator to improve the service level, making
the supply chain achieve optimal coordination. And the improvement in compensation price
makes the revenue of ISV decrease, so when achieving effective coordination in supply chain,
ISV’s revenue is lower than the highest revenue, which will result in a loss of revenues. These
losses of revenues transfer payment to SaaS operator through compensation price, and then
ensure the improvement of the service level of SaaS operator.
4. Discussion and Implication 
In the traditional economic, there is a law of diminishing marginal returns, marginal revenue
equals marginal cost is the equilibrium of profit-maximization. But the study finds that in the
SaaS service supply chain, the point where the marginal revenue equals the marginal cost is
not the equilibrium of ISV’profit-maximization.
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As  the  above  comparison  between  the  decentralization  decision-making  and  centralization
decision-making shows that ISV’s compensation price deviates from its optimal compensation
price of profit-maximization,  when achieving the optimal coordination of supply chain.  The
results  are not consistent  with the economic interpretation about marginal  revenue equals
marginal cost in traditional economics.
Market  equilibrium  theory  in  traditional  economics  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  the
marginal  utility  decreases  and  the  marginal  cost  increases  (as  shown  in  Figure  2a).As
production  increases,  marginal  revenue  diminishes,  and  marginal  cost  increases.  When
marginal revenue is greater than the marginal cost, the total revenues increase as production
increases; when marginal revenue is lower than the marginal cost, the total revenues decrease
as  production  increases.  The  equilibrium  of  revenues  maximization  is  the  intersection  of
marginal benefit and marginal cost.
Figure 2. The traditional market equilibrium and the positive feedback of software market. (a) The
traditional market equilibrium (b) The positive feedback of software market. 
According to the theory of William Brian Arthur, the increase of the marginal revenue will lead
to positive feedback, appearing many possible equilibrium in economy. When the increasing
marginal  revenue  curve  intersects  the  marginal  cost  curve,  the  phenomenon  of  positive
feedback will be shown in the software market, which is “the strong will be stronger, and the
weak will be weaker”(Sheng, 2009).
Based on the network economy theory, there is the law of increasing marginal returns, and a
positive  feedback  phenomenon  in  software  product  market,  resulting  in  the  point  where
marginal revenue equals marginal cost is no longer the market equilibrium point (as shown in
Figure 2b). The marginal revenue increases with the demand increasing, the marginal cost
decreases with the demand increasing, and the positive feedback (Sheng, 2009) point is where
marginal revenue equals the marginal cost. When the market demand is on the left side of the
positive  feedback  point  where  the  marginal  revenue  is  less  than  the  marginal  cost,  the
company suffers losses; when the market demand is on the right of the positive feedback
where the marginal revenue is greater than the marginal cost, the company gets profits, and
the marginal profit will increase as the demand increasing. Therefore, through analysis of the
conditions of effective coordination of SaaS service supply chain in compensation contract, that
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is f1 = p – C0i, we can find that the point which achieves the effective coordination of the supply
chain in compensation contract is the positive feedback point of ISV market instead of the
traditional market equilibrium.
Positive feedback theory can better explain the development patterns in network economic
that companies must invest a large before getting profits.  Many network enterprises have a
relatively long input phase, and the harvest of benefits need to wait for the breakthrough of
positive feedback point in the market. Because of the network effect, the company’s marginal
profit will increase rapidly, once entering the state of profitability. At the same time, the law of
diminishing marginal cost can also explain the acceptable market price of network products will
decline rapidly with the expansion of the business scale. Especially, as the expansion of the
market scale, the phenomenon of price reduction is universal in the products which have the
network feature such as software products and electronic products (Yuan & Han, 2011), SaaS
is no exception. With the propelling of the positive feedback mechanism, the rental price of
SaaS service will diminish gradually as the decreasing of marginal cost, and its profit will go up
rapidly with the increase of the demand.
5. Conclusion 
Software as a Service (SaaS) has become a hot topic in industry of information technology and
will  be  the  mainstream  model  of  IT  services  delivering.  Compared  with  traditional
manufacturing supply chain and general  service supply chain,  in  the field of  SaaS service
supply chain, there are many mew topic which need to be discussed using new methods and
theories from a new perspective.  Therefore the classic contracts, which be widely used in
traditional manufacturing supply chain, can’t be directly applied in SaaS service supply chain.
This paper focuses on the coordination of SaaS service supply chain, has build a new model of
compensation contract, which be used to discussed how do the ISV motivate SaaS operators to
improve  the  service  level  through  effective  contracts  mechanism  under  conditions  of
asymmetric information. 
In this paper, considering information asymmetry, it is supposed the service level (which is
related to the degree of effort) of SaaS operator was private information, and the model of
compensation  contract  has  been  constructed,  i.e.,  to  motivate  SaaS  operator  to  improve
service level through transfer payments of compensation price. A new found is that there are a
positive feedback phenomenon in the SaaS market, that is the point where marginal revenue
equals marginal cost. And it is interesting that is no longer the market equilibrium point such
as the traditional economic said. But it is a point on the right of where the marginal revenue
will  increase  as  the  demand  increasing.  And  It  is  found  that  when  ISV  get  to  “positive
feedback”, the linear compensation contract can coordinate the SaaS service supply chain well.
The subject  of  this paper fully  caters to  the needs of industry development, is  frontier  of
theoretical  study  and  industry  development.  This  paper  put  forward  some  contracts  and
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motivating  mechanism  for  effective  coordination  of  SaaS  service  supply  chain  and  the
conclusion  will  enrich  content  of  service  supply  chain  theory  system  and  promote  the
development of study and practice of SaaS and IT service industry. 
There are several theoretical and practical implications. In theory, it has more significance for
further researching on SaaS and service supply chain. And in practice, it is beneficial to ISV,
platform operators and customers. And some effective contract models are the key of the
development of IT service industries. 
In  additional,  there  are  some  limitation  of  linear  compensation  contracts.  In  the  linear
compensation, the compensation price is fixed value. If in the contract, we can create a change
value  which  is  related  to  the  sales  volume  of  service,  the  coordination  efficiency  of
compensation will be increased. 
In the future, there are many researches we will do. At first, in this paper only the basic model
and  the  linear  model  has  been  build.  In  the  future,  in  order  to  resolving  more  practical
problems, the nonlinear compensation contracts should be researched. And second, we try to
relax some assumptions, such as service types and sales cycle. In addition, platform operators
change information asymmetry in supply chain and contract mechanism under different states
of information symmetry or asymmetry should be researched in future.  Another important
thing is that in this paper we discuss coordination efficiency of compensation contract for SaaS
service supply chain based on the hypothesis of the service capacity (q) unlimited. In the
future, the condition that the market demand exceeds the maximum market capacity, that is,
service delaying should be concerned. 
Acknowledgments
The  authors  gratefully  acknowledge  the  Funding  Project  for  Academic  Human  Resources
Development in Institutions of Higher Learning Under the Jurisdiction of Beijing Municipality
(No. PHR201108389), the Project for the Beijing excellent talents (No.2012D005022000004),
the Funding of research plan from the education committee of Beijing (SQSM201211417002)
and  the  Funding  project  of  Beijing  Philosophy  and  Social  Science  Research  Program
(11JGB039).
References
Arie, G.,  & Grieco, P.L.E.  (2012). Do Firms Compensate Switching Consumers? Simon School
Working Paper, No. FR 12-13. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1802675
Cachon, G.P., & Lariviere, M.A. (2001). Contracting to Assure Supply: How to Share Demand
Forecasts  in  A  Supply  Chain.  Management  Science,  47(5),  629-646.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.47.5.629.10486
-1184-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.789
Concha,  D.,  Espadas,  J.,  Romero,  D.,  &  Molina,  A.  (2010). The  e-HUB evolution:  From a
Custom  Software  Architecture  to  a  Software-as-a-Service  implementation.  Computers  in
Industry, 61(2), 145-151. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.compind.2009.10.010
Demirkan, H., Cheng, H.K., & Bandyopadhyay,  S. (2010). Coordination Strategies in an Saas
Supply  Chain.  Journal  of  Management  Information  Systems,  26(4),  119-143.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/MIS0742-1222260405
Dey,  D.,  Fan,  M.,  &  Zhang,  C.  (2009). Design  and  Analysis  of  Contracts  for  Software
Outsourcing. Information Systems Research Articles in Advance, 1-22.
Fan, M., Kumar, S., & Whinston, A.B. (2009). Short-Term and Long-Term Competition between
Providers  of  Shrink-Wrap  Software  and  Software  as  a  Service.  European  Journal  of
Operational Research, 196(2), 661-671. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2008.04.023
Katzmarzik, A. (2011). Product Differentiation for Software-as-a-Service Providers. Business &
Information Systems Engineering, 3(1), 19-31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12599-010-0142-4
Laffont,  J.J.,  & Martimort,  D.  (2002).  Incentive  theory  (Vol.1):  the  principal-agent
model．Beijing：Renmin University of China press.
Mathew, M., & Nair, S. (2010). Pricing Saas Models: Perceptions of Business Service Providers
and Clients. Journal of Services Research, 10(1), 51-68.
Mietzner, R., Leymann, F., & Unger, T.  (2011).  Horizontal and vertical combination of multi-
tenancy  patterns  in  service-oriented  applications.  Enterprise  Information  Systems,  5(1),
59-77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17517575.2010.492950
Roels,  G.,  Karmarkar,  U.S.,  &  Carr,  S.  (2010). Contracting  for  Collaborative  Services.
Management Science, 56(5), 849-863. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1100.1146
Susarla, A.,  Barua,  A., & Whinston, A.B. (2010). Multitask Agency, Modular Architecture, and
Task Disaggregation in Saas.  Journal of Management Information Systems, 26(4), 87-117.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/MIS0742-1222260404
Shao X., & Ji, J. (2008). Research on coordination between supply chain pricing and capacity
design based on compensation contract.  Chinese Journal  of  Management Science,  16(4),
62-68.
Sheng X. (2009). Network Economics[M]. Beijing: Publishing House of electronics industry.
Tsay, A.A. (2001).  Managing retail channel overstock:  Markdown money and return policies.
Journal of Retailing, 77(4), 451-492. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0022-4359(01)00055-0
-1185-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.789
Van Donselaar, K.H., Gaur, V.,  Van Woensel, T., Broekmeulen, R.A., & Fransoo, J.C.  (2010).
Ordering  Behavior  in  Retail  Stores  and  Implications  for  Automated  Replenishment.
Management Science, 56(5), 766-784. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1090.1141
Yan  C. (2010).  The  capacity  coordination  of  service  outsourcing  supply  chain  under
compensation contract. Journal of Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University (Philosophy and
Social Sciences), 13(5), 70-73.
Yan, J., Guo, Y., & Schatzberg, L. (2012). Coordination Mechanism of IT Service Supply Chain:
An Economic Perspective.  Electronic Markets,  22(2), 95-103.  http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12525-
012-0086-2
Yuan, H., & Han, S. (2011). The Effects of Consumers' Price Expectations on Sellers' Dynamic
Pricing  Strategies.  Journal  of  Marketing  Research  (JMR),  48(1),  48-61.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.48.1.48
Zhang  W.  (1996).  Game Theory  and Information Economics. Shanghai:  Shanghai  people's
Publishing House.
Zhang, Y., Liu, S.J., Wu, L., & Jiao, Y.C. (2010). Service-oriented Enterprise Interoperability in
Automobile Supply Chain Management.  Computer Science and Information Systems, 7(1),
31-49. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/CSIS1001031Z
Appendix
Proof of Formula 3 
The objective function as follows：
max
f 1
π i( f 1 ,μ
*) = ( p− f 1)·Q(μ
*)− f 0−C i−C 0i ·Q(μ
*)
The optimal service level of SaaS operator is (Formula 2): μ s1
* = εa ( f 1−C0s) ;
The market demands is Q = εμ + θ;
Solving the first-order condition for the compensation price, we obtain:
∂π i
∂ f 1
=−[ ε
2
a
( f 1−C0s) + θ ] + ( p− f 1)· ε
2
a
−ε
2
a
C0i
=−
2ε 2
a
f 1 + ε
2
a
( p+C0s−C0i) −θ
∂2π i
∂ f 1
2 =−
2ε 2
a
< 0 , the optimum exists.
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Let 
∂π i
∂ f 1
= 0 , get, 
f 1
* =
p+C0s−C0i−θ ·
a
ε 2
2
Because θ is market random factor, the optimal compensation price can be written as：
f 1
* =
p+C0s−C0i−θ
2
Without considering θ, the optimal compensation price of ISV can be written as：
f 1
* =
p+C 0s−C0i
2
 (Formula 3)
Q.E.D
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